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OCA 88-3561

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The Honorable Bill McCollum U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. McCollum,

The Director has asked me to respond to your 27 September letter in which you expressed concern about the way national security priorities are set, and concern that a formal, unspoken policy may exist which places intelligence matters above the lawful pursuit of terrorists. I assure you that this Agency, in fact, considers its contribution to the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism efforts to be an intelligence matter of the highest priority. We have concentrated our offensive operations against this target with good effect—including, specifically, our efforts to track down terrorists—and we are working closely with the State Department, Justice Department, the FBI, and the military to bring terrorists to justice.

There will always be turf battles in government, but we believe that the inter-agency working groups on terrorism have gone a long way toward sorting out the differences you mention. In the fight against terrorism, the Agency's primary mission is clear: we collect intelligence and disseminate it to the customers responsible for apprehension. Outside the territorial limits of the United States, we will provide all the support we are capable of providing in mounting operations designed to apprehend an individual wanted for acts of terrorism against citizens of this country. You have mentioned the Fawaz Younis case. We believe it is a perfect example of how we can, and have, assisted the Justice Department and the FBI in the apprehension and extradition of terrorists to this country.

The 23 September <u>Washington Post</u> article, accusing the CIA of withholding intelligence on North Korean efforts to smuggle Hughes 500 helicopters out of the U.S., is dead wrong. On



27 September 1988, Customs Commissioner Von Rabb testified, in open session before the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, that the article was "blatantly untrue." In close questioning from Congressman Dorgan, Commissioner Von Rabb said that Customs had received information from the CIA on the intended diversion well in advance, but at the time Customs did not have properly trained personnel to handle intelligence information. The Subcommittee testimony is available for review and I would commend it to you.

On the issue of the plane crash that killed Ambassador Raphel, General Wassom and President Zia: immediately after the accident, the State and Defense Departments moved quickly to obtain the approval of the Pakistan Government for the U.S. to provide technical assistance to the Pakistani board of inquiry. A team of USAF specialists was assembled and sent to Pakistan within hours, to be joined a few days later by Lockheed experts.

We are satisfied that the U.S. technical advisory team dispatched to Pakistan was well qualified, including some of the world's best expertise in analyzing the causes of C-130 crashes, and that it accomplished its mission as thoroughly and professionally as possible under existing conditions. Now that the technical findings of the U.S. team and the Pakistani board of inquiry are available, we are in a better position to evaluate the need for further investigations. As you know, the Pakistani board recommended that a further investigation be ordered to identify the perpetrators of criminal acts, or sabotage, that may have caused the crash.

The State Department has shared with the FBI all the information it has on the crash and is consulting with it on possible U.S. Government contributions to future investigations.

We are pleased that you also sent a copy of your letter to the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. The Committee is well aware of what the Agency is doing on the terrorism target and should be able to address your specific concerns.

John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

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No answer expected or required
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Executive Secretary

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Executive Secretary

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BTH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND **URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON** THE JUDICIARY

## Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

DISTRICT OFFICE: **SUITE 301** 1801 LEE ROAD WINTER PARK, FL 32789 (305) 845-3100 FROM LAKE COUNTY, TOLL FREE: 383-8541

September 27, 1988

The Honorable William Webster Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC

Dear Director Webster:

Several incidents have been reported in the news lately which have caused me some concern about the way in which our Specifically, I am national security priorities are set. concerned that a formal, unspoken policy may exist which places intelligence matters above the lawful pursuit of terrorists.

As the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Crime, I have worked extremely hard -- in cooperation with Justice officials -- to help stop terrorism and provide adequate support through law to our agencies who are charged with the task of tracking down and preempting terrorists. Moreover, the facts of many of these cases, like Fawaz Younis, are familiar to me.

Furthermore, my position on the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law has allowed me to see closeup the effects of terrorist attacks upon innocents -- like the refugees in Pakistan where in 1987, 234 persons were killed, and 1,200 were wounded (nearly half of all deaths and injuries from terrorist attacks worldwide) due to WAD attacks.

In addition, the experience of the Iran/Contra committee has left an overall impression that all is not well where our intelligence collection professionals and our terrorism experts are concerned. I listened very carefully to the former Deputy Director of Operations and an official then responsible for terrorism at the CIA discuss the horrible "turf battles" which take place within the national security bureaucracy on these matters.

Let me cite two recent events which put this problem into practical terms.

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Page Two Hon. William Webster

A Friday, September 23, 1988, <u>Washington</u> <u>Post</u> article reported that North Korean agents were able to smuggle eighty-six sophisticated helicopters out of the U.S. because the CIA refused to report the scheme to law enforcement officials. Their reason: a sensitive source. It seems the possibility that such aircraft could be used for crossborder military attacks or terrorist activity was discounted.

Another incident, which I have closely followed, is the derailment of an FBI investigation into the plane crash in Pakistan which killed our Ambassador, Arnold Raphel, General Herbert Wassom and Pakistani President and U.S. ally, Mohammed Zia ul-Hag.

Although the State Department was the actual department which refused permission to the FBI terrorism experts, neither CIA, DoD or Justice made formal complaints. My suspicion is of course, that Secretary Shultz is extremely concerned that if, as the Pakistanis have said repeatedly, the crash was the result of sabotage or terrorist action, that the trail might lead to the Soviet-controlled Afghan intelligence service, WAD.

Certainly, the CIA is aware of these possibilities. Why therefore, have we not seen an effort to insist that these angles are pursued? Is the CIA simply an observer with no responsibility? A bystander who watches a murder but feels no duty to call the police?

You, having served as head of the FBI and as DCI presently, know better than I both sides of the coin: law verses intelligence. And you were chosen to head the CIA because you understand the dire consequences of an unbalanced national security perspective.

It is my view, that we must maintain the integrity of both of these national security components -- without compromising basic principals. I bring these two recent reports to your attention simply because they raise particular moral questions. And it is my hope that you will consider these questions in your capacity as the head of our nation's intelligence community.

Page Three non. William Webster

A similar letter has been addressed to the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Your consideration is appreciated.

Singerely

BILL McCOLLUM

Member of Congress